Defends Evacuation
Subway Report Has Fire Chief Smoking

By GINGER ADAMS OTIS

A state report detailing communication and procedural failures between the Police Department, Fire Department and New York City Transit during an emergency subway evacuation last summer came under heavy criticism from FDNY commanders at a Jan. 30 City Council hearing.

The Chief-Leader/Michel Friang 'THIS REPORT IS GARBAGE': Bronx Borough Commander James Esposito, flanked by NYPD Transit Bureau Assistant Chief James P. Hall (left) and Capt. Robert A. Weinman from the FDNY's public transportation safety unit, disputed several of the assertions made in a state safety report that faulted firefighters for evacuating subway passengers caught in critically smoky conditions before power to the third rail was cut off.

The oversight meeting, jointly organized by Fire and Criminal Justice Services Committee Chair Miguel Martinez, Public Safety Chair Peter F. Vallone and Transportation Chair John C. Liu, was an attempt to find out why reliable first-responder communication is still elusive during subway emergencies.

'State Report Garbage'

But Mr. Liu hit a sore spot with an FDNY Chief when he referred to the state Public Transportation Safety Board report, which faulted firefighters for, among other things, evacuating passengers from a train while the third rail was still live and "without notifying NYC Transit or any NYC Transit crew members."

"This report is garbage," said FDNY Bronx Borough Commander James Esposito, dismissively lifting it and then letting it drop. "Not once did someone from this office speak to me about what happened that day. And I was the commander in charge."

The Safety Board, which is part of the state Department of Transportation, drew up its report in the wake of an Aug. 16 track fire that broke out around 6 p.m. just inside the D-line subway tunnel on the Brooklyn side of the Manhattan Bridge.

A spokeswoman for the Public Transportation Safety Board did not respond to a request for information on how the report had been compiled.

Hit FDNY Hardest

Although it mentions numerous communication and procedural errors from dispatchers at NYC Transit's Rail Control Center, the report's post-accident critique suggested the FDNY was out of line for initiating evacuations without communicating properly with other agencies.

The Chief-Leader/Michel Friang HIT A NERVE: City Council Member John Liu trod familiar ground at a hearing Jan. 30, reiterating his concerns that radio communications aren't all they should be in the subways.

But while the report carefully documented NYC Transit's actions throughout the incident, it offered no information on the circumstances that prompted FDNY Chiefs to make the decision to evacuate as they did.

The omission clearly vexed Assistant Chief Esposito, who emphasized that the Captain on the scene who first entered the smoke-filled car had carefully calculated "the risk versus the reward," as he was trained to do.

"Tunnel fires are extremely dangerous," he said. "After we had been on the scene for several minutes, it became clear that the situation was degenerating, the smoke conditions were worsening and people were starting to panic. At no time did anyone step onto the track bed - the train was situated so that it was almost even with a platform. We're talking about little more than one step to safety."

According to Assistant Chief Esposito and other officials who testified, the fire was caused by debris on the road bed. The fire occurred adjacent to a track 900 feet south of the Manhattan Bridge and just north of the DeKalb Ave. Station.

The state report, which agreed on the fire's origin, noted that the area has little clearance for train traffic, and therefore can't be cleaned by NYC Transit vacuum trains that suck up flammable debris. The need for cleaning is determined by Supervisors, based on track inspections. The fire likely flourished because of a build-up in debris in the area, the report asserted.

At 6:03 p.m., the report said, a southbound Train Operator made three unsuccessful attempts to contact the Rail Control Center and the DeKalb Tower Operator to report smoke on the track. Two minutes later, the Train Operator of a second southbound train repeated those attempts at contact.

Dispatchers Didn't Hear

Upon later investigation, it was determined that dispatchers at those centers were at their assigned spots at those times, but they never received the radioed messages.

Shortly before 6:08 p.m., the Train Operator of a northbound train succeeded in reaching the Rail Control Center and reported the smoky conditions. At 6:10 p.m. the Train Operator emitted a "12-1" code, indicating an emergency situation, during which time all non-emergency radio traffic should cease.

The Train Operator requested that the FDNY be notified. At 6:14 p.m., a call was sent.

Train traffic along the southbound lane was stopped, leaving two trains suspended on the bridge. One of them was already two cars into the portal of the tunnel on the Brooklyn side. The Train Operator told Rail Control that smoke conditions were getting heavy. He moved passengers to the rear of the train.

FDNY in Dark

The FDNY arrived on the scene at 6:20 p.m., but because of communication breakdowns with NYC Transit, had yet to confirm exactly where the fire was located. Two companies responded to the Manhattan side of the bridge, while those in Brooklyn tried to communicate through dispatchers to find out if the fire was in the train, on a platform or along the track bed.

An FDNY source described NYC Transit's Rail Control Center as "extremely confused" at the time. In accordance with the Citywide Incident Management System used in emergency situations, the FDNY took the lead when it arrived on the scene.

Assistant Chief Esposito confirmed at the hearing that officers on the ground were having difficulty getting accurate information from NYC Transit dispatchers. But the officers were able to communicate what they knew back to MetroTech, where he was coordinating the response.

Climbed Between Trains

The Captain on the scene, in conjunction with several Chiefs, decided to cut a hole in the fence between the roadway and the train and gained access to the cars by climbing up between them.

According to the Safety Board report, NYC Transit's Rail Control Center at that time was still trying to confirm how many trains were stuck on the bridge. The process was hindered by a clerical error that had mislabeled one of the trains. The report found that "radio traffic was extremely heavy, making it difficult for any communication transmissions to get through." Nonetheless, the board criticized the FDNY for sending its Captain into the train without alerting NYC Transit.

Assistant Chief Esposito said the Captain, once inside the train, moved through the cars, calming passengers, until reaching the Conductor. Upon learning that the fire was in front of the train on the track bed, and that there was no way to back the train out, he radioed to request that power be shut off. He repeated his request several minutes later.

Left With Power On

At 6:39 p.m., said Assistant Chief Esposito, as smoke inside reached "critical condition," the FDNY began evacuating passengers by opening a side door of one of the middle cars and stretching a ladder to the walkway of the Manhattan Bridge.

At 6:45 p.m., the Rail Control Center succeeded in turning off the power to the third rail. Firefighters then began running hoses into the tunnel to extinguish the fire. By 7:15 p.m. all the passengers were safely evacuated. The FDNY had the fire under control by 8:36 p.m. and had removed all personnel from the tracks and concluded operations by 8:56 p.m.

Thirteen passengers and two firefighters were transported to area hospitals for treatment of smoke inhalation. Twelve passengers and four firefighters sustained minor injuries that did not require medical attention.

Transit's Responses

At a meeting Aug. 23 of city agencies to discuss how the incident occurred, the Safety Board noted that NYC Transit needed to update its clerical process for identifying trains, reiterate the importance of non-emergency radio silence after a 12-1 code, improve track inspections, establish a better code to better identify a pending emergency and develop a check list for those staffing Incident Command Posts.

But the board also faulted the FDNY for not "sharing information in a timely manner." It said the FDNY agreed to develop guidelines to be utilized for critical information that needs to be conveyed to the Incident Commander at the scene.

One FDNY source said, however, that without the prompt response of the firefighters, many of the passengers could have suffered far more serious smoke inhalation problems, and evacuation would have taken much longer.