Know Your Rights: New Pay Claim Filing Rule

Know Your Rights:
New Pay Claim Filing Rule


The fast-moving conservative U.S. Supreme Court has struck yet again. This spring, the nation's high court issued a decision, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc., which fundamentally alters the filing requirement for employees alleging pay disparities under the Federal anti-discrimination law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The decision is an unmistakable setback for employees claiming discriminatory pay practices in the workplace.

James A. Brown is a partner in the law firm Brown & Gropper, LLP. He can be reached at (212) 366-4600 and at jabrownlaw@aol.com . Employees who allege violations of Title VII must file their Charges of Discrimination within 180 days with the Federal agency known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (This filing requirement in New York State is extended to 300 days). Under Ledbetter, employees alleging pay disparities must now demonstrate that the discriminatory practice which created the pay disparity occurred within the 180/300-day period preceding the filing of the charge. Because such disparities often are not apparent until years after the actual discriminatory pay practice is committed, this new filing requirement will deprive many employees of a remedy, under Title VII, for such discriminatory practices.

History of Unequal Pay

The Ledbetter plaintiff began working in the Goodyear plant in 1979. She claimed the poor performance evaluations she received were motivated by gender discrimination, and that they negatively affected her pay raises over the years she worked for Goodyear. In 1998, the plaintiff contacted and then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging that she was earning significantly less than her male counterparts.

That same year, the plaintiff filed her lawsuit and a jury awarded her back-pay and other damages. Goodyear then filed an appeal claiming that the plaintiff's Title VII charge had been untimely filed with the EEOC. Goodyear argued that discrimination occurring more than 180 days before the plaintiff contacted the EEOC was time-barred and that there was no evidence of discriminatory pay practices during that 180-day period (nor any evidence of discrimination after the plaintiff filed her EEOC charge). The appellate court agreed and reversed the favorable jury verdict.

Sharply Divided Court

A sharply divided Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal. In so doing, the high court departed from the EEOC's own filing procedures and with the vast majority of courts which had held that an EEOC charge is timely filed when a current pay-check reflects a pay disparity (regardless of how long ago the discrimination that caused the disparity occurred).

The court's five-member majority stated that ignoring the EEOC's short filing deadline would impose on employers "the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions which are long past." The majority emphasized that the prompt processing of such claims is especially important because an employer's intent is relevant and "evidence relating to intent may fade quickly with time."

The four dissenting justices took a decidedly dim view of the majority's "cramped interpretation" of Title VII. According to the dissent, Ledbetter deviates from the court's own precedent and that of lower courts which "overwhelmingly held" that the current payment of a disparate pay-check re-sets the filing deadline for an EEOC charge.

Dissent Issues Warning

The dissent favored continuing the practice of permitting a current pay-check, which shows a discriminatory disparity, to re-start the EEOC filing deadline regardless of when the underlying discrimination occurred. According to the dissent, disparate pay practices are "often hidden from sight" and are harder to identify than more obvious adverse actions taken against employees (such as firings, demotions, transfers, etc.). This is because management generally declines to publish pay rates, and employees typically do not disclose their own salaries. As a consequence, employees are not likely to suspect discrimination until well after the 180/300-day deadline expires, causing that employee's claim to be time-barred.

The dissent concludes with a plea to the Congress to amend Title VII to remedy the court's new, restrictive filing requirement. Until then, employees with pay-disparity claims (based on gender or race, etc.) may find the state and local anti-discrimination laws more hospitable. Until Title VII is amended, New York City employees with pay claims, based on discrimination which occurred more than 300 days ago, will have to rely on state and local law.