Track 'Culture' Contributed To Subway Deaths; Vow Enforcement Of Safety Precautions In Track Work

Track 'Culture' Contributed To Subway Deaths; Vow Enforcement Of Safety Precautions In Track Work


An "organizational culture" that led transit workers and their supervisors to disregard safety rules and precautions was a critical factor in the deaths of two Track Workers in separate incidents in April, according to New York City Transit panels that examined the fatalities.

SAY DEATHS WON'T BE FOR NAUGHT: Transport Workers Union Local 100 President Roger Toussaint (left) and New York City Transit President Howard H. Roberts said the deaths of two Track Workers in April have galvanized them to ensure that there is better communication between train controllers and work crews, and that Track Workers and their supervisors follow all safety rules rather than engaging in short cuts that place them in danger. NYC Transit President Howard H. Roberts released the two reports by its Boards of Inquiry Aug. 2 at a joint press conference with Transport Workers Union Local 100 President Roger Toussaint. At NYC Transit's lower Manhattan headquarters, the two presidents said that they wanted to improve the "culture" of safety in addition to suggesting new rules. Mr. Roberts will respond to the suggestions in the reports within 30 days.

Confluence of Errors

Track Worker Marvin Franklin, 55, was hit and killed by a Queens-bound G train while crossing that track to perform repairs on the A/C line at Brooklyn's Hoyt-Schermerhorn St. station April 29. Five days earlier, Track Worker Daniel Boggs died after being struck by a downtown-bound 3 train at Manhattan's Columbus Circle station.

"A significant number of things tended to go wrong, in effect, at one time," said Mr. Roberts.

The report on Mr. Boggs's death determined that he was partly at fault because he walked west across the tracks without looking in both directions.

"In doing so, he violated a number of NYC Transit rules and regulations," the report said.

But it also said that a supervisor was unable to establish radio or telephone communication with Rail Control Command and instruct it to turn power off on the line. It said that not all employees have access to radio communication. Train service on the express track was supposed to be suspended at 11 p.m. that night, but was permitted to go through - without the track crew's knowledge - at 11:20 p.m. because a train had stalled on the downtown local track.

"Personnel performing work on or adjacent to the Right of Way should have the ability to monitor radio transmission for service disruption or emergencies that could impact their operations as well as to have the ability to report unsafe conditions or request assistance in the event of an injury," said the report.

Alarm Not Working

It also noted that an emergency alarm box was found non-operational at the incident, and that "no formal procedure existed with regard to working" in such an area.

In the report on Mr. Franklin, NYC Transit's Board of Inquiry put the blame on his supervisor, Lloyd London. It concluded that he failed to intervene when he saw Mr. Franklin and two other Track Workers inadvertently putting themselves in harm's way. It noted that the workers disregarded essential safety procedures, but that they were following orders. Mr. Franklin and his colleagues had been instructed to retrieve a track dolly in order to clean up scrap on the track.

"At the time all three [Track Workers] were standing in the middle of Track EI, which was in service," it said. "The employees were traversing energized contact rails carrying a heavy metal object with no third rail mats being utilized to protect them for the contact rails ... As a member of supervision [Maintenance Supervisor Level I] London has the greatest culpability in this incident."

For Mr. Roberts, these reports showed that there is not enough general compliance with rules at NYC Transit by employees and supervisors alike. Mr. Toussaint believed that the process of issuing and perfecting rules has not been adequately carried out.

Blaming Short-Cuts

"I think what the investigation shows is perhaps taking short cuts as defined by not observing certain rules may be more of a routine thing than an exception," said Mr. Roberts. "We want to put together a system that people internalize."

In the report on Mr. Franklin, the Board of Inquiry concluded that employees' lack of awareness of track safety bulletins also contributed to the accident.

"A great level of accountability in ensuring employees are aware of essential information can be achieved by issuing the most important information in the form of a positive compliance directive, which requires an employee's signature to verify that they have received the information and are cognizant of the content of the document," the report suggested.

Mr. Roberts said NYC Transit has not ruled out taking disciplinary action against some of the individuals deemed culpable in the reports.

Lack of Communication

The two leaders also acknowledged the lack of proper communication between Rapid Transit Operations and Maintenance of Way, as workers in the latter must seek permission from workers in the former before they step onto the tracks. Mr. Toussaint hoped that the distribution of radios would improve communication between Train Operators and Track Workers.

Since the deaths, NYC Transit has imposed a number of new standards, such as discouraging the use of generators that make too much noise and requiring a supervisor to escort a Flagger as he positions flags. In addition, an NYC Transit statement said, "When the work requires suspension of train service, prior to lamps or portable train trips being placed along the right-of-way, the supervisor in charge of the work crew must contact the appropriate personnel at the Rail Control Center to confirm that the track has been cleaned of all passenger train service."

The Board of Inquiry was made up of five officials from the agency's Office of System Safety: Patrick Lavin, Manager of Rail Investigations; John Soucheck, the Director of Field Operations; James Wincek, the Director of Hazard Assessment; William Walter, the Director of Investigations, and Ronald Alexander, the Director of Safety Operations. Local 100 Rapid Transit Operations Division Vice President Curtis Tate also served on the Board.

Banking on Task Force

Governor Spitzer signed a bill establishing a track safety task force July 3. It will consist of the state Commissioner of Transportation, the president of Local 100 and the President of NYC Transit. Its duty is to evaluate, inspect and recommend safety measures for track work. Mr. Toussaint hailed the task force's creation after a bill central to the union's legislative agenda establishing state regulations for track work at NYC Transit failed to gain a sponsor in the State Senate in May. At the press conference, he said he was confident the task force would address the safety concerns documented in the reports.

Saying that the job is safer now than when he was a Track Worker, Mr. Toussaint noted that in addition to developing safety standards with NYC Transit through the task force, Local 100 is conducting a survey of Track Workers in an attempt to get a better idea of safety issues that need to be addressed. The union has also worked with NYC Transit inspecting work sites and determining if workers and supervisors were complying with rules since the two deaths.

One recently implemented measure that he highlighted was the removal of all Track Workers from tracks when a train is reversing.

"What we will see are some pretty far-reaching steps coming out of this process," said Mr. Toussaint. "We look forward to laying down standards."