POLICE PAY-PROBLEM POLITICS
Razzle-Dazzle
Police Pay-Problem
Politics
Ray
Kelly has a problem: the starting salary for Police Officers. |
Pat Lynch has a variation on that problem: the salary for Police Officers
already on the job. And while as a career cop the Police Commissioner may feel
an added sense of responsibility to pay new officers well enough to ensure that
he's attracting good candidates, the PBA president feels the direct pressure of
accountability from his rank-and-file, with an election looming next spring.
That difference explains why, while some of their public statements create
the impression they're locking arms in common cause, they're in an adversarial
position as the PBA seeks a new contract to replace the one that expired 22
months ago.
Working on Different Timetables
Mr. Kelly would like that contract settled tomorrow, provided it
boosts the pay scale for new officers enough to no longer be an embarrassment.
That desire was reflected in a Bloomberg administration pay offer two weeks ago
that undoes much of the damage inflicted on the "unborn" by a PBA arbitration
award last June that used the resulting savings to grant two 5-percent raises to
cops already on the job.
SEPARATE
REALITIES ON PAY ISSUE: Police Commissioner Ray Kelly (left) wants
the pay scale for new cops significantly increased immediately to
help recruitment. But Patrolmen's Benevolent Association President
Pat Lynch appears to have concluded that his best hope of winning
re-election is through a contract arbitration process that would
likely take long enough to force the next two classes of rookies to
receive the sharply reduced starting salary produced in last year's
arbitration.
Bloomberg
administration officials believe that Mr. Lynch, on the other hand, would be
happy if there was still no contract by this time next year, regardless of how
that might affect NYPD hiring. There are two reasons for that belief. Each
succeeding police class that the NYPD struggles to fill because the current pay
schedule is in effect adds pressure on the city to boost its offer in order to
get a deal. And from a political standpoint, Mr. Lynch might be better off with
no deal than one his members consider inadequate when they vote on whether to
give him another four-year term. |
The basic pattern for uniformed employees has already been set for the
two-year period at issue here. Unions representing Firefighters, Correction
Officers, Sanitation Workers and Detectives have all accepted raises of 3
percent and 3.15 percent. Given the historic parity relationship between Police
Officers and Firefighters, that would seem to suggest there's no way out of the
pattern-bargaining box for Mr. Lynch, even if he chooses, as he did during his
previous two contract rounds, to pursue an arbitration case.
One veteran official from another union put it this way: "That parity is so
strong that there isn't an arbitrator that's going to be willing to break it."
Correction Officers' Benevolent Association President Norman Seabrook two
weeks ago explained his decision not to play out the string in hope of a miracle
by saying that "to continue to wait for other unions to negotiate their
contracts where at the end of the day everyone ends up with the same thing
doesn't make any sense to me."
He has a security blanket to ward off the chill that might ensue if he has
calculated wrong: a reopener clause that would allow him to seek additional
raises for his members if the PBA winds up breaking the pattern "outside the
collective-bargaining process." (That means if the Legislature were to provide a
pot of money for police salary increases that exceeded the pattern, the other
uniformed unions would have the right to try to recapture parity for this
bargaining round. A PBA windfall in arbitration, on the other hand, would fall
within the realm of the collective-bargaining process.)
A Blizzard of Paperwork
Mr. Lynch, in contrast to the COBA leader, is not close to ready to
bow to the conventional wisdom and accept the "pattern" deal. Instead, he and
his lawyers have served the Bloomberg administration with several summons books
worth of requests for information on matters ranging from all communications
between the Mayor's Office of Management and Budget and city and state agencies
to the recruitment and retention data for agencies as far afield as the Health
and Hospitals Corporation and the Buildings Department.
Lieutenant's Benevolent Association President Tony Garvey, apprised of some
of the materials Mr. Lynch had requested, declined to speculate on his
motivation but remarked, "If I was looking to delay [contract talks], I would be
requesting minutiae from the city on issues not necessarily germane to the
bargaining process."
City officials, none of whom was willing to speak for attribution, describe
the data requests as an extended fishing trip on a cruise toward arbitration.
They theorize that, much as President Bush used Iraq during his re-election
campaign to argue that you don't change Commanders-in-Chief in mid-battle, Mr.
Lynch plans to make a similar argument if the arbitration case is still slogging
along at the time that PBA members vote a year from now.
If that scenario comes to pass, it's likely that the next three police
classes will be filled - and that word is used advisedly - with recruits who
ignored the paltry starting salary for a job that includes life-threatening
activities. Beyond the discomfort Mr. Kelly feels at paying the newcomers - some
of whom may have parents he knows who are ex-cops - so poorly, there has to be
some uneasiness that the effect on morale could make it easier for some officers
to justify corrupt conduct.
Threat to His Legacy
Mr. Kelly's second stint as Police Commissioner, during which he's
been able to further reduce crime despite placing a new emphasis on
anti-terrorism work while operating with several thousand fewer cops than were
on the job under his predecessor, has him poised to be regarded as one of the
best leaders in the NYPD's history. Any wrongdoing by cops who wouldn't have
been hired unless the NYPD was desperate for warm bodies could take some of the
luster off that image.
Mr. Lynch issued a statement regarding the union's voluminous request for
documents that indicated he was not looking to drag out the process.
"The city has failed to provide the PBA with the most fundamental information
regarding this round of contracts," he said. "Every piece of information we have
requested is being sought for use in our effort to gain a fair and competitive
contract for New York's police officers through negotiations. We are moving
expeditiously to reach an agreement at the table but we will not disadvantage
our position in bargaining to move on a timetable driven solely by the city's
inability to fill its academy class."
For Mr. Lynch, NYPD desperation to fill that class is potential leverage,
either at the bargaining table or in arbitration. He has three past precedents
to encourage him: two special salary hikes, using state funds to pay the excess
portion of the raises, for Teachers over the past 21 years, and a similar
dispensation, relying on city money, for Health and Hospitals Corporation Nurses
in the late 1980s.
Recruitment Woes Key
In each case, the rationale for departing from the municipal pattern
was a major problem in recruiting qualified candidates. The 1985 situation with
the United Federation of Teachers paralleled the current one with the PBA in one
added respect: in each case, the union deserved at least some of the blame for
the inadequate starting salary.
The prevailing suspicion was that the leaders of those unions - the late
Albert Shanker for the UFT, Mr. Lynch as part of last year's arbitration - had
made calculated political decisions to short-change the bottom of their pay
scales to get more money for experienced members to secure their votes.
Mr. Shanker's defenders at the time argued that it also made little sense for
him to give equal treatment to the lower steps on the UFT salary scale during a
period starting with the mid-1970s fiscal crisis when the Board of Education was
doing very little hiring. Mr. Lynch can't use that justification, since the NYPD
has to hire about 3,000 cops a year just to keep pace with attrition.
The big difference between those cases and this one, however, is that the
Bloomberg administration, while acknowledging a recruiting problem with its
recent offer to upgrade the pay plan for new cops, has not indicated any
willingness to go beyond the bargaining pattern it has established with other
unions to address the situation.
No Impact on Streets
One reason is undoubtedly that while the reduced pay scale has
forced the NYPD to scramble to attract qualified candidates, it has not yet
affected its primary missions. Until that changes, the Bloomberg administration
has no incentive to address the complaint by PBA officials that the fate of the
NYPD is being dictated by the "bean-counters" who are insisting on treating cops
the same as all other city employees at the bargaining table.
City officials counter that it is Mr. Lynch who is being oblivious to the
well-being of the NYPD in order to bolster his bargaining position. As evidence,
they cite one particularly spicy request from the PBA amid the mountain of data
the union is seeking: detailed calculations of how much the city would save if
the next contract froze the pay scale at current levels.
Such a freeze would affect only the officers who came on the job since
January and future recruits. The fact that the rookies already have been whacked
with a reduced pay scale that will cost each of them at least $48,000 during
their first six years on the job compared to officers who were hired last July
means such a move would not hurt Mr. Lynch politically; it's hard to imagine
many of those cops voting for the president who let their loss fund the generous
hikes for more-senior officers.
City Cool to Freeze
The city, which last year joined the PBA in signing off on the
reduced pay scale because whatever impact it has on recruiting is more than
offset financially by the recurring savings it will provide, has no intention
this time of voluntarily agreeing to a freeze of that scale. The question is
whether any arbitrator could be convinced to grant such a request as a way of
paying for more-generous raises to incumbent cops.
The PBA could argue that if the costs even out with other uniformed deals, it
should be allowed to have an award structured this way to make maximum salary
more competitive with what is paid to cops in neighboring suburbs. The
arbitrator would have to consider, however, the impact this would have in
disrupting salary parity with Firefighters, which has historically been pegged
to the maximum pay for each rank. (Rookie Firefighters actually advance to the
second step on the pay scale, from $25,100 to $32,700, nearly three months
sooner than their NYPD counterparts as a result of Uniformed Firefighters'
Association President Steve Cassidy's determination to upgrade their pay as soon
as they completed their shorter training period.)
All these factors raise questions as to whether Mr. Lynch has a realistic
hope of breaking the existing uniformed pattern, or is delaying the inevitable
for political reasons.
Case Against Stalling
A case could be made that waiting actually hurts his chance of
re-election, notwithstanding the fact that, as one union insider noted, a
serious challenger to Mr. Lynch has yet to emerge.
By the time elections are held next spring, another 3,000 cops whose pay
scale marks them as second-class union citizens will be PBA members. Even if as
many as one-third of the officers who came in under the reduced rate become
disillusioned enough with their salaries to quit the NYPD, that would still
leave 3,000 out of a group of 4,500 with a strong motivation to vote against Mr.
Lynch.
That's a significant bloc of opposition voters to start with. Add in the
anti-incumbent votes that are inevitable in a work force where even veterans are
frustrated about their salaries, and Mr. Lynch's task becomes particularly
formidable if a sizable segment of his rank and file starts asking whether it
can realistically expect a pending arbitration to give cops a better deal than
what Firefighters got.
One veteran of the negotiating wars with no involvement in the PBA dispute
put it this way: "Norman Seabrook is a lot better-connected [politically] than
Lynch is, and he's taking 3 and 3.15. That should tell you something."
PERB No Magic Carpet
Mr. Lynch has counted on his previous arbitrations being before the
state Public Employment Relations Board, the result of legislation one of his
predecessors got approved that removed the PBA from the jurisdiction of the city
Office of Collective Bargaining. For years, PBA officials suggested PERB held
the key to the universe; that if their members' aspirations were measured
primarily against compensation for other cops statewide rather than against what
other municipal unions got, it could break the chains of pattern bargaining.
In practice, the union has had limited success in fulfilling those
predictions. The PERB legislation, it should be remembered, was pushed hardest
during the 1990s by PBA lawyers and a bargaining consultant who later went to
prison for bribing Transit Police union leaders for business. The PERB law has
continued to hold its greatest attraction for those union service providers who
get paid for arbitration work, no matter how good the results.
The one significant break the PBA got from a PERB arbitrator came in 2002,
when he granted the same two 5-percent raises over a 24-month period that most
other uniformed unions received under 30-month contracts.
Second Time a Mess
Last year's arbitration produced two more 5-percent pay hikes, but
in return the union had to accept concessions affecting future members that
knocked four points off the deal's cost to the city. The salary reduction and
the stretching of the pay scale also caused major problems for other uniformed
union leaders, who because of lower attrition rates could not offer the city the
same savings under the stretch as the PBA. That forced them to agree to other
givebacks to get the same raises. Compounding their anger was the pledge Mr.
Lynch had given not to pursue a contract that had a component tied to attrition.
Mr. Lynch subsequently said that commitment applied only to the bargaining
table, and that once the dispute moved to arbitration it was beyond his control.
Some officials argue, however, that his determination to get 5-percent annual
raises for veterans was unrealistic unless he or his bargaining counsel, Michael
Murray, were figuring all along on selling out the unborn and the other
uniformed unions.
Pattern Too Low for 5s
Unlike in 2002, when he entered arbitration knowing that the worst
he figured to do was two 5-percent hikes because that was what the Uniformed
Forces Coalition had negotiated, the pattern staring at the PBA throughout last
year's arbitration came from a District Council 37 deal that featured a
nonpensionable $1,000 bonus and a 3-percent increase in its first two years.
That lower baseline meant that unless the unpredictable chair of last year's
arbitration panel, Eric Schmertz, decided to pay no attention to the city
pattern, Mr. Lynch's only hope of getting the two 5-percent hikes was to take it
from the hides of his unborn.
This time around, the existing uniformed bargaining pattern makes the chance
of a runaway arbitration award less than slim, and he can no longer count on the
Bloomberg administration being complicit in a maneuver to reward veteran cops at
the expense of those not yet on the job.
Maybe a third trip to arbitration will prove to be the lucky one. Maybe his
members, like the American public, will buy the argument that whatever gripes
you have with your leader, you don't cast him off in the middle of a conflict.
The danger there, of course, is if PBA members ask themselves how happy the
American public now is that it took President Bush's advice along those lines.
Cheap Trick Might Work
There's one other possible explanation for Mr. Lynch's unwillingness
to fall into line behind his uniformed brethren. It might be called the Seelig
Principle, in honor of its most faithful adherent, former COBA President Phil
Seelig.
Mr. Seelig developed a habit of waiting out other labor leaders and then
settling for similar terms well after his old contracts had expired. The trick
behind this strategy was that he seemingly orchestrated the settlements so that
his members received paychecks containing the large sums of retroactive money to
which they were entitled at roughly the same time that COBA election ballots
were sent out. His members may have sensed that they were being manipulated, but
their good spirits over the big checks tended to trump such misgivings: rather
than being voted out of office, Mr. Seelig was able to leave under his own steam
almost immediately after getting his law degree.
It's a cynical gambit, to be sure, but none of Mr. Lynch's alternatives for
breaking parity with Firefighters holds greater promise of electoral success.